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The article analyses the economic aspects of establishing the practice of remote client identifi-
cation by Russian credit institutions. Developing such practices is necessitated by the perma-
nent digitization of the interaction between subjects of banking relations. The article presents 
the results of an analysis of the economic aspects of remote client identification by banks 
in developed and developing countries (Austria, Great Britain, India, China, USA, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and South Korea). The research reveals the theoretical and practical peculiarities 
of the banking biometric identification system currently functioning in Russia. On the basis 
of this analysis, the author identifies economic reasons for the lack of motivation of most Rus-
sian banks to develop new practices. For the first time in Russian economic literature, the key 
problems that impede remote client identification have been discussed systematically, includ-
ing: a) risk of unauthorized access to the central database; b) concerns about privacy viola-
tions; c) lack of free access to materials on software testing, guarantees of developer compa-
nies, operators, etc.; d) risk of unauthorized access to the UBS by outsiders successfully using 
identification procedures; e) exposure to financial risks from unauthorized access to the UBS, 
transferred to clients; f) unsatisfactory results of combating banking cybercrime in Russia. 
The author advances several robust proposals to overcome these problems and minimize the 
economic risks of applying remote client identification systems in Russia, taking into account 
the positive and negative experiences of foreign countries.
Keywords: biometrics, video-identification, UBS, client identification, cybercrime, online 
identification, fintech, economic risks of remote identification.
Introduction
Global digitization is an inevitable characteristic in the development of the modern 
economy. On the one hand, it leads to an increase in the commercial efficiency of enter-
prises, and on the other to an increase in customer satisfaction due to lowered prices for 
goods and services, better quality of services provided, and so on. At the same time, the 
transition to remote channels of digital interaction between companies and their clients 
can entail increased business risks, which negatively affect the motivation and, conse-
quently, the speed of introducing such innovations into many sectors of the economy. For 
example, banking is one of the most conservative business sectors, and ongoing changes 
in standardized products (e.g. the possibility to choose your own payment card design) 
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are banking marketing activities, i.e. actions that do not change the established system of 
interaction between credit institutions and their clients. However, in the short term, much 
may change dramatically in retail banking. On June 30, 2018, the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation set about creating a national system of remote client identification by 
banks (hereinafter the innovative project, the project) following the adoption of Federal 
Law No. 482-FZ “On introducing amendments to separate acts of the Russian Federation” 
of December 31, 2017. Meanwhile, domestic banks are obliged to start collecting biomet-
ric data of citizens in all their branches by the end of 2019.
This study is comprehensive in nature, which determines the following structure of 
presentation of information. In the beginning, the fundamental principles of the function-
ing of the institution of remote customer identification established in Russia were ana-
lyzed, on the basis of which the existing economic contradictions were highlighted; this 
made it possible to formulate a scientific hypothesis, purpose and objectives of the study. 
Then, on the basis of a literary and practical review, the experience of the functioning of 
relevant institutions abroad was systematically systematized (by the examples of economi-
cally developed and developing countries). The above has become the basis for identifying 
and formalizing the existing problems of establishing the institution of remote customer 
identification in the russian banking system (in the economic aspects), as well as justifying 
strategic measures to overcome them. In the final part, the general foresight risks of global 
digitalization during the formation of the institute of banking remote biometric identifica-
tion in Russian are discussed and the results of the study are summarized.
Fundamentals of the functioning of the banking remote identification 
system in Russia
Remote identification is a mechanism that allows individuals to receive financial ser-
vices remotely by confirming their identity with biometric personal data (face image and 
voice) at any bank1. Theoretically, a citizen of the Russian Federation can hand over his 
biometric samples once (free of charge) at one bank and then remotely open accounts, 
make transfers, apply for loans, etc. in any2 national credit organizations (Figure 1).
When the client applies to register biometrics, the bank performs the identification in 
the traditional way (by passport) and enters the client’s data into the USIA (if the client has 
not previously been registered on the public services portal). Then, the client is videotaped 
and his voice is recorded by repeating all digits three times (in descending and ascending 
order, as well as in a random sequence). After successful biometric registration, customers 
can access the services of those banks whose software supports remote bio-identification. 
This procedure is as follows: on the website of the relevant credit institution the client en-
ters the section “Internet bank”/ “online bank” or downloads the bank’s mobile application 
to a smartphone. The client then passes a simple primary registration and is redirected to 
1 Central Bank  of the Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/fintech/remote_authentication/ 
(accessed: 11.02.2019).
2 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation compiles a special list on a monthly basis of banks to exclude 
institutions: a) non-licensed to attract funds of individuals; b) to whom measures to prevent bankruptcy of 
banks are applied; and c) to whom the Central Bank prohibited remote identification. Additionally, banks 
can independently deny clients remote identification if: a) the citizen is on a special “black list” (on grounds 
of terrorism, extremism); the bank has substantiated suspicions (Materials of ConsultantPlus. URL: http://
www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_32834/ (accessed: 12.01.2019)).
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the USIA website, where he enters a login and password, and then completes his biometric 
verification with the help of the UBS3.
Remote identification systems will soon be universal. In theory, the system will in-
crease the accessibility of banking services for all residents of Russia, as small or remote 
settlements often have no bank branches at all, or only a Sberbank branch (i.e. there is no 
competition). In megacities, personal visits to bank offices are inhibited by the shortage 
of car parking and the ever-increasing pace of life. At the same time, the “transfer” of cus-
tomer services to the “virtual world” can significantly reduce bank expenses (personnel, 
premises, office equipment, etc.) and increase the accessibility of financial services.
Economic contradictions, hypothesis, research aims
Despite the economic attractiveness of a remote identification system, less than 
3 000 biometric templates were created throughout the country in the first four months of 
its operation4. No other official data has been published either by the Central Bank or the 
business media. In addition, the number of banking offices conducting biometric identifi-
cation of clients has not increased, but instead has decreased. In 2019, “Russians refuse en 
masse to submit biometrics to banks”5. This indicates a serious economic contradiction. 
On the one hand, on the initiative and with the active participation of the mega-regulator 
of the financial market (the Central Bank), Russia has established an institution of remote 
biometric identification of clients by banks, the functioning of which should increase: 
3 The SIEC is not used in remote identification procedures (i.e. later). Instead, biometric identifica-
tion is carried out through vendors, companies that have signed relevant agreements with Rostelekom. For 
example, Tinkoff Development Centre is one organization that is “authorised to conduct recognition of 
customer voice samples in the process of remote identification” (Materials of TASS. URL: https://tass.ru/
ekonomika/5695468 (accessed: 12.01.2019)).  
4 Newspaper “Vedomosti”. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/2018/11/12/786133-prov-
erke-tsb-k-sboru-biometrii (accessed: 11.02.2019).











 Fig. 1. Simplified scheme of biometric registration process
Note: the dashed line shows the reverse transmission of information; Rostelekom PJSC is the 
operator of USIA and UBS, the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation 
is the operator of SIEC. 
B a s e d  o n: the methodological recommendations of Rostelecom on working with the Unified 
Biometric System (version 1.12)  (Materials of Rostelecom. URL: https://bio.rt.ru/upload/iblock/
a8f/Metodicheskie-rekomendatsii-po-rabote-s-Edinoy-biometricheskoy-sistemoy-_Versiya-1.12-
ot-13.09.2018_.pdf (accessed: 12.01.2019)). 
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a) the efficiency of the financial and credit system of the country as a whole, and b) the 
level of consumer satisfaction. However, in reality, both banks and individuals show low 
interest in the development of an innovative institution. The former try to comply only 
with formal requirements of the Central Bank for participation in the process (not to be 
subject to penalties), and the latter try to avoid providing biometric samples6.
This allows us to formulate our main hypothesis: there are a number of significant 
economic problems in developing remote biometric identification of clients in Russia’s 
banking system initiated by the Central Bank, resulting from the lack of economic interest 
by credit institutions and by citizens in active and voluntary participation. An integrated 
approach is required to overcome these constraints. Thus, the main goal of this research 
is to develop a set of measures to overcome current problems connected with the forma-
tion of remote client identification in the Russian banking system. To achieve this goal 
it is necessary: a) to study international experience in the relevant field; b) to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of objective reasons for low motivation among Russian banks and 
their clients to participate in the formation and development of remote biometric identi-
fication; c) to formulate and structure key problems; d) to examine problematic areas in 
state policy and measures of cybercrime prevention in the banking sector of Russia, which 
impedes the development of remote biometric identification of clients by banks; e) to pro-
vide justification for the measures and means for overcoming the identified problems; and 
f) to identify the general risks of global digitization, which should be taken into account 
when exercising regulatory influence on the development of remote biometric identifica-
tion in the medium and long terms.
Literature review
Almost all modern economists agree that digitization has a serious impact on the 
evolution of “familiar tools for managing banking products and services” [Kozlova, Usti-
nova, 2019]. According to experts at Digital McKinsey, “in Russia the penetration of re-
mote banking services falls behind the penetration of the Internet, which indicates the 
potential for its further growth”7. At the same time, the ongoing “digital revolution” in 
modern Russia and in most developed and developing countries makes remote mainte-
nance a key technology that allows a bank to intensify its growth in a saturated market and 
increase its competitiveness [Vengerovskij, 2018; Martens, 2018].
One essential requirement for remote banking is to carry out procedures for remote 
identification of the client. As E. V. Chaikina noted, “without remote identification, it is 
difficult to introduce new financial technologies” [Chajkina, Kozinkin, Chajkin, 2018, 
p. 114]. At the same time, the procedure, despite the absence of personal contact between 
client and authorized bank employee, should be legally binding. It is obvious that “any legal 
solutions technologically depend on the nature and functioning of digital technologies” 
[Naumov, 2018, p. 126], entailing the risk of loss both on the part of banks and their clients 
due to malicious actions of third parties. These risks are managed from two sides: by the 
6 Thus, some banks “require their clients to submit biometric data on a mandatory basis” (Banki.ru. 
URL: https://www.banki.ru/news/bankpress/?id=10898888 (accessed: 19.01.2019)).
7 Mckinsey’s materials. URL: https://www.mckinsey.com/ru/~/media/McKinsey/Locations/Europe 
%20and%20Middle%20East/Russia/Our%20Insights/Digital%20Russia/Digital-Russia-report.ashx (acces-
sed: 25.01.2019).
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bank’s compliance control services inspecting suspicious transactions [Emets, 2019], and 
by improving identification procedures. In foreign countries, institutions apply diverse 
types of biometric identification not because of “their innovative nature, but because they 
are available and accessible for all citizens, regardless of the level of literacy and education” 
[Dostov, Shust, Kozyreva, 2017, p. 104].
Unfortunately, in modern Russian science, issues of biometric identification of cli-
ents in the banking sector are covered in a fragmented manner, which is largely due to 
the novelty of the subject. Most authors focus on technical aspects of various types of 
biometric identification [Lozhnikov, 2017; Yakimenko, Vikhman 2016] and there is very 
little research on their economic aspects8. S. V. Krivoruchko notes that such technologies 
“increase the indicators of accessibility of payment services in the world and in the Rus-
sian market of non-cash transactions” [Krivoruchko, Maklakova, 2017, p. 186]. The work 
of E. A. Medvedev briefly summarises the applied aspects of the system of remote identi-
fication of bank borrowers at Home Credit Bank [Medvedeva, 2018]. At the same time, 
there are no works devoted to problems of forming remote client identification in the 
Russian national banking system. It is important to emphasise that the structure of foreign 
research is generally similar to Russian research, with a general focus on technological 
[Awad, 2016; Kumar, 2019] rather than economic issues [Indrayani, 2014; Gelb, Decker, 
2011] in the operation of identification systems and models in the banking sector. Econo-
mists generally agree that “providing simple and secure online access to banking systems 
through biometrics is a priority for banks” [Charles, 2018, p. 91].
The above makes it particularly important to study the experience of foreign coun-
tries in the field of formation, functioning, and future development of remote client iden-
tification.
Banks’ worldwide practice of remote client identification
These systems have been functioning in a number of foreign countries for quite a 
while [Krivoruchko, Ponomarenko, Lopatin, 2019]9.
Indian experience. The world’s largest repository of biometric templates is the Unique 
Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Since 2009 it has accumulated biometric in-
formation of more than 1 bln users’ fingerprints and irises [Banerjee, 2015]. However, in 
January 2018 The Tribune published results of an investigation, according to which it only 
costs 8 doll. and takes 10 minutes for an anonymous hacker to provide journalists with 
access rights to the UIDAI database, plus another 5 doll. to buy a program to fabricate 
ID-cards of a country’s resident”. (Although not for a complete passport replacement, this 
can be used to perform a wide range of banking and other operations)10. Further, the 
8 A significant share of research, however, is conducted by students [Krylova, Rudakova, 2018; Naz-
arov, 2018; Shnekutis, Gobareva, 2018].
9 Some interesting information can also be found in the report of the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation (“Review of the international market of biometric technologies and their use in the financial 
sector”) (Central Bank of the Russian Federation URL: https://www.cbr.ru/Content/Document/File/36012/
rev_bio.pdf (accessed: 12.02.2019)). However, it is carried out in a referential and “positive” way, i.e. without 
critical analysis of “problem areas”. Materials in this paragraph are not excerpts from this review; they have 
been obtained by the author through an independent analysis of a wide array of foreign primary sources.
10 Materials of the newspaper Tribune-India. URL: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rs-
500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details/523361.html (accessed: 02.02.2019).
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NGO “Center for Internet and Society Studies” presented a convincing report, according 
to which confidential information from the UIDAI database appeared publicly on govern-
ment websites at least four times11.
Swiss experience. In March 2016, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority 
(FINMA) for the first time permitted video and online customer identification, the results 
of which were deemed the equivalent of a personal visit to a bank’s office. The idea here 
is to enable bank employees to communicate with clients “live” through a “teleconference 
bridge”, where the clients answer various questions, and present their passports and other 
documents (including tilting them to verify whether holograms are present). There is no 
direct interaction with the client in online identification, which necessitates stricter pro-
cedural requirements. First, the bank has to ensure that the person whose identity is being 
verified will make a transfer from his or her account to an account opened with any Swiss 
bank or bank in Liechtenstein. Second, the client has to confirm his or her residential ad-
dress (e.g. utility bills, postal receipts, etc.).
Following the success of the online identification system, the regulator (FINMA) low-
ered requirements in July 2018. Thus, video identification no longer required sending one-
time SMS passwords, and online identification made the mandatory transfer requirements 
simpler (previously, the sender’s bank had to be located in Switzerland or Liechtenstein)12.
Austrian experience. In January 2017, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) 
allowed local banks to conduct video identification of clients, with mandatory storage of 
an electronic file recording all stages of the procedure. High quality screenshots (separate 
photos) of the client’s face, and the front and the back of the identity document were to 
be produced13. For example, a large Austrian bank Erste Bank und Sparkassen conducts 
video identification of new clients from 8:00  to 12:00 daily, with the process taking no 
more than ten minutes14. The development of innovative technologies in Austria is largely 
based on (and mirrors) the successful experience of Germany.
Swedish experience. In 2002, a number of major Swedish banks (Handelsbanken, 
Swedbank, etc.) established the company Finansiell ID-Teknik, whose function was to 
operate the digital identification platform BankID15. Within this platform, clients can re-
motely receive banking services, submit various documents to government agencies (dec-
larations, applications, etc.), and execute contracts with various companies. The BankID 
system, however, does not require the client’s biometrics analysis, using a traditional login 
and password for identification16. These can be obtained via: a) a personal visit to the bank 
office; and b) existing Internet banking systems. There is no possibility of remote opening 
11 Materials of Center of Internet & Society. URL: https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/informa-
tion-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof/ (accessed: 03.02.2019).
12 Instead, there was introduced an automated verification of whether a person undergoing online 
identification is a living being (Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht FINMA. URL: https://www.finma.ch/
en/news/2018/07/20180717-mm-video-online-id (accessed: 03.02.2019)).
13 The Financial Markets Authority (FMA). URL: https://www.fma.gv.at/download.php?d=2665 (ac-
cessed: 02.02.2019).
14 Erstegroup. URL: https://www.erstegroup.com/en/news-media/press-releases/2017/01/23/erste-
bank-introduces-video-based-identification-of-new-customers-alias (accessed: 07.02.2019).
15 Bankid. URL: https://www.bankid.com/en/om-oss/about-finansiell-id-teknik (accessed: 07.02.2019).
16 To increase security, the information on personal BankID can be stored on a plastic smart card. It 
is inserted into a special card reader (similar to those used in “usual” ATMs and payment terminals), which 
is then connected to a computer. The card reader is issued by the servicing bank (Bankid. URL: https://
support.bankid.com/sv/bestalla-bankid/bestalla-bankid (accessed: 08.02.2019)).
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of bank accounts. A client must at least once provide personal identification in one of the 
banks. The number of unique BankID users is constantly increasing. As of November 1, 
2018 it exceeded eight million people. Given that the total number of Swedish residents 
is tne million, on average the service covers 80 % of the total population, the figure being 
even higher among people aged 21 to 50 years — 95–97 %17.
The experience of the UK and US banks. In 2006, the UK adopted the Identity Cards 
Act, under which the National Identity Register was established. The Register collected 
personal data of the citizens, including biometric information. Four years later, however, 
both the Act and the Register ceased [Martin, 2012]. The United States has never had a 
national biometric databank18.
Currently, most financial institutions do not use or support primary remote client 
identification, including the Bank of America19, Barclays20, and others. To register online 
in traditional Internet banking or mobile banking systems, a citizen should already have 
an active account, a payment card, etc. There is also a crucial difference between authen-
tication when using web-banking (traditional “client-bank” system launched on personal 
computers) and mobile banking, i.e. applications that work on smartphones. In the first 
case, “classic” passwords consisting of numbers, letters and (or) signs are used to log in21. 
In the second, the customer’s fingerprints or a selfie (online photo) may be used to access 
the site. Such options are offered by Citi, Royal Bank of Scotland, Wells Fargo, etc.22
What is characteristic of the bioidentification systems described is that banks do not 
collect clients’ biometric data in advance or during the maintenance process. Neither do 
they store, transfer, verify, or protect data. All technical aspects (and liability) rest entirely 
on smartphones, which send a command to the bank’s mobile application.
The experience of South Korea. In April 2018, the government abolished the compul-
sory identification of banks’ customers via “traditional” passports or electronic signatures 
certified by the unified national government certification system (the latter has been in 
force for the last 20 years). In just three months, the Korean Federation of Banks (KFB) 
announced the launch of the private block system BankSign (developed by Samsung)23. 
It allows clients to perform transactions using mobile banking systems of different banks, 
provided they initially have an account (bank account) in one of them. Personal identifiers 
may include fingerprints, “traditional” passwords and other templates24. They are verified 
by smartphones (there is no national repository of personal data), with blockchain tech-
nology preventing illegal use of stolen personal data for counterfeiting electronic access 
17 Bankid. URL: https://www.bankid.com/assets/bankid/stats/2018/statistik-2018-10.pdf (accessed: 
06.02.2019).
18 The United States does not have a single “national identity card”; a driver’s license is often used as 
an identification document.
19 Bank of America. URL: https://secure.bankofamerica.com/login/enroll/entry/olbEnroll.go (acces-
sed: 01.02.2019).
20 Barclays bank. URL: https://bank.barclays.co.uk/olb/authlogin/loginAppContainer.do /identifica-
tion (accessed: 02.02.2019).
21 Wells Fargo bank. URL: https://connect.secure.wellsfargo.com/auth/login/present (accessed: 
11.02.2019).
22 Citi bank. URL: https://online.citi.com/us/jrs/pands/detail.do?id=citimobilesmartphones&jfp_to-
ken =spbtlwis (accessed: 11.02.2019).
23 CCN. URL: https://www.ccn.com/banksign-samsung-blockchain-south-korea/ (accessed: 11.02.2019).
24 Samsung. URL: https://www.samsungsds.com/global/en/about/news/banksign.html (accessed: 
11.02.2019).
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certificates. Unlike all the above systems, electronic access is subject to periodic (once in 
3 years) prolongation, which can be carried out only after personal identification of the 
client. Unlike all systems considered above, electronic access is subject to periodic (1 time 
in 3 years) prolongation, carried out only after personal identification of the client. At the 
end of 2018, the BankSign system was primarily offered by mobile banking. However, 
many major Korean banks (KEB Hana, Woori, etc.) are adapting the technology for web-
banking systems to be used by enterprises (planned to be completed by the 1st half of 
2019)25.
The Chinese experience. China is currently conducting several simultaneous experi-
ments on remote identification of people that banks could introduce in the short and 
medium terms [Khan, 2018]. First, since 2015 the Ministry of Public Security has been 
working on developing a powerful facial recognition system to allow banks to identify any 
citizen within three seconds (with an accuracy of 90 %)26. Second, in Guangzhou Province 
since 2017, any user of the WeChat national messenger (WhatsApp analogue) can obtain a 
virtual identification card (analogue of the government passport)27. After the recognition 
of a person with a smartphone, a citizen will be able to access government, banking, and 
other services.
Conclusions regarding foreign experiences. First, the interest of both clients and banks 
in remote identification is increasing across the world. This leads to a gradual liberaliza-
tion of banking rules, especially in developed countries. Second, principles and rules of 
using remote identification of clients by banks in all countries differ significantly, and 
there is no single approach to remote identification28. Third, developed countries have not 
chosen the option to create a single (national) data base of citizens’ biometrics. Instead, 
many European banking systems have been developing a hybrid system of video identifi-
cation of new clients (e.g. Austria and Switzerland). Fourth, the UK and the USA have no 
primary remote identification at all. At the same time, many large banks allow their clients 
an opportunity common in many countries (including Russia) to access mobile banking 
services from smartphones, using fingerprints or selfies. At the same time, new customers 
can open a bank account only if they personally visit the bank. Fifth, in a number of devel-
oped countries (e.g. Sweden) traditional (not biometric) methods of remote client authen-
tication — logins, passwords, card readers — continue to be used successfully. Sixth, the 
most “IT advanced” countries have already created more secure block-chain platforms for 
remote identification, which run on “ordinary” gadgets (i.e. without a national biometric 
databank). Seventh, in a number of countries (e.g. South Korea) customers need to renew 
their identification periodically (every three years) by personally visiting a bank’s branch 
to continue using remote services. Eighth, a number of high-profile hacker attacks on na-
tional biometric databanks took place in a number of developing countries (e.g. India) in 
2018. As a result, confidential information of a large number of users (e.g. 55 mln people 
in the Philippines) was disclosed to the public29. Ninth, many countries (e.g. China) first 
25 Etnews. URL: http://english.etnews.com/20181008200002 (accessed: 12.02.2019).
26 SCMP. URL: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2115094/china-build-giant-facial-
recognition-database-identify-any (accessed: 12.02.2019).
27 SCMP. URL: https://www.scmp.com/tech/social-gadgets/article/2125736/wechat-poised-become-
chinas-official-electronic-id-system (accessed: 15.02.2019).
28 There are many various biometric parametres, including keyboard rhythm [Lozhnikov, 2017].  
29 Association of progressive communications. URL: https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Briefing-
National-ID-3.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2019).
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conduct long-term testing of new systems and pilot operations in small areas: a) to debug 
processes, and b) to reduce potential commercial and reputational risks when implement-
ing relevant innovations on a full scale.
All of the above determines the particular importance of analyzing the problems of 
the system of remote client identification emerging in Russia, as it is of a potentially “dan-
gerous” nationwide nature.
Involvement of Russian banks in developing  
the institute of remote client identification:  
Challenges
Regardless of the position of the Central Bank of Russia, which supports the rapid de-
velopment of this innovative project, the overwhelming majority of 410 domestic banks30 
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Fig. 2. Information on the number and share of banks collecting the biometric data of 
citizens (as of December 1, 2018)
Note: the “other” category includes 11 banks, among which there are small regional credit institutions 
(Ural FB, Kamkombank, etc.) that collect customer biodata only in 1–2 offices.
B a s e d  o n: Central Bank of the Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/fintech/remote_
authentication/map/ (accessed: 15.01.2019).
Only six large and medium-sized banks are actively involved in the widely announced 
innovation project, with all of them, except the Post Bank, piloting relevant services in a 
number of selected offices (from 3 to 30 % of the total number). However, by December 1, 
2018, the total number of bank branches participating in the project implementation was 
less than at the start of the program — 393 offices in 133 localities against over 400 offices 
collecting bio data in 140 cities as of July 1, 2018.
30 Central Bank of Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/credit/default.aspx a_115 (accessed: 
15.01.2019).
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2020. Т. 36. Вып. 2 275
It is important to emphasize that the most systemically important banks, includ-
ing Sberbank (14 249 offices31), Russian Agricultural Bank (1317 offices), Otkrytie Bank 
(763 offices), etc. do not conduct biometric data collection and do not plan to participate 
in this project in the future.
To participate in the project, banks should purchase special equipment worth about 
4 mln rub. for the first workstation and 130 thousand rub. for each subsequent32. For me-
dium and small banks, with the number of branches usually not exceeding 50–100, the 
total cost will be only about 10–15 mln rub. Large market participants will have to spend 
more: Alfa Bank will have to spend at least 100 mln rub. However, it is obvious that such 
expenditures are a “drop in the ocean” for an organization whose assets exceed 3 trln rub. 
Further, some invested capital will be recovered. In the future, for each successful remote 
identification, a new servicing bank will have to pay a fee (currently 200 rub.) and some 
part of which will be transferred to the bank that conducted the initial collection of bio 
data of the client33. 
In such a situation, an important scientific and applied task is to identify the eco-
nomic reasons for the poor performance of banks in establishing remote identification. 
The author identifies three main reasons.
Reason I. Large banks reasonably fear a decrease in their income because of “customer 
migration”. They do not want their wide networks of branches, whose operating costs are 
truly enormous, to work de facto for other banks, attracting new clients for them.
For example, many residents from small villages can pass primary bio-identification, 
after which they can open accounts in “city” banks and transfer their savings to them. This 
happens because interest rates on deposits in Sberbank and Russian Agricultural Bank, 
which have virtually monopolized rural areas, are significantly lower than in many “con-
ventional” commercial banks. With large deposits (up to 1.4 mln rub.) fully insured by the 
state, state banks are no longer able to secure their key advantage — a priori reliability. At 
the same time, “advanced” urban residents, having submitted bio data in one of the offices 
of large banks, can then turn to other credit institutions.
To a lesser extent, major banks are concerned about the “migration” of their loan 
portfolios. Not all retail banks are ready to grant loans to clients who live 300–500 km 
from their nearest office. (The main reason is that for the case of overdue debts, it can be 
more complicated to interact with such clients).
Reason II. Many large, medium, and small banks demonstrate little real interest in the 
transition to remote interaction with clients. 
Firstly, there are potential high risks in providing online loans. Currently, only a small 
number of banks are ready to issue loans “in absentia”, i.e. without personal visits by bor-
rowers to bank offices (Sberbank34, Home Credit35, etc.). We should note that these banks’ 
effective risk management systems cost them tens of billions of roubles because of bad and 
31 The information on the number of offices is presented hereafter as of 1 December 2018 (Central 
Bank of Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/credit/default.aspx a_115 (accessed: 15.01.2019)).
32 Newspaper “Kommersant”. URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3731093 (accessed: 07.02.2019).
33 Order of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian 
Federation №  322 of June 25, 2018. (Matrerials of ConsultantPlus. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/
document/cons_doc_LAW_302043/ (accessed: 17.02.2019)).   
34 Sberbank. URL: https://www.sberbank.ru/ru/person/credits/money/consumer_unsecured_fin 
(accessed: 18.02.2019).
35 HomeCredit bank. URL: https://www.homecredit.ru/online/credit?fid=0 (accessed: 18.02.2019).
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overdue debts written off from their balance sheets. However, most retail banks (Russian 
Standard36, OTP-bank37, etc.), being ready to accept online applications, inform clients 
only of a preliminary loan decision. Documents must be signed only after personal in-
terview during which a secondary check of client’s credit status is performed; based on 
those results, clients are often denied a loan. Second, banks are doubtful that the option 
of remote account opening will significantly increase competitive advantages and attract 
citizens’ deposits. Competition in the deposit market is not as intense as in the credit seg-
ment at present (there are many money available but few bona fide borrowers). However, it 
does not take much time to open a bank account at a bank’s office — usually no more than 
20–30 minutes — and the client can perform all further operations remotely via Internet 
and mobile banking systems. 
Third, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation controls whether or not commer-
cial banks comply with Federal Law No. 115–FZ “On countering the legalization of illicit 
gains (money laundering) and terrorism financing”. Any violation thereof, according to 
Article 20 of Law No. 395–1 “On banks and banking activities”, may result in revocation of 
a bank’s license. In this connection, remote account opening can seriously increase risks 
to banks. For example, currently a bank has no legal grounds to refuse to accept bio data 
from a citizen who has a passport. For many clients the bank would certainly not open a 
current account or provide a loan (based on visual screening or after additional verifica-
tion), but it is still ready to provide “harmless” identification services. Such clients might 
submit their bio data in one bank and then open accounts in other credit institutions for 
a fee for shadow bankers.
Reason III. Doubts persist about cybersecurity of the biometric customer identification 
database generated by banks, and banks are reluctant to become “guinea pigs” when setting 
up and debugging systems. The cost of an error can amount to billions of rubles and, much 
worse, to reputational losses that are difficult to remedy. 
Solutions. The first problem is to be solved by the Central Bank of the Russian Fed-
eration in a purely administrative way (regulatory requirements and fines for non-per-
formance). It is likely that the regulator will prolong the deadlines for commercial banks 
to join the project, as well as ease the requirements on mandatory biometric equipment 
at each bank office. The second issue can be resolved only by the market. Banks should 
recognise the benefits of their participation in the project. This is unlikely to happen before 
the third fundamental problem of banking cybercrime is solved.
Banking cybercrime as a key factor hindering the development of remote 
client identification by Russian banks
The media are currently rarely covering topics related to the theft of money in elec-
tronic form [Shatalov, 2018]. With cashless payments using bank plastic cards38 increas-
36 Bank «Russian standart». URL: https://anketa.rsb.ru/pil/7264/firstWebFormPil (accessed: 
18.02.2019).
37 OTP-Bank. URL: https://www.otpbank.ru/retail/credits/ (accessed: 18.02.2019).
38 For example, in 2008 89.7 % of transactions performed by individuals using payment cards 
were related to cashing in ATMs and cash offices of banks. However, in the first half of 2018 the figure 
reduced almost threefold — to 36.3 %. The remaining ≈⅔ included payments for purchases in stores and 
transfers between customers  (Central Bank of Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.
aspx?file=p_sys/sheet014_1.htm&pid=psrf&sid=ITM_48796 (accessed: 21.02.2019)).
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ing, there may develop a false sense of complete protection of modern banking Internet 

























































Volume of unauthorized operations, committed using payment cards, bln rub.
Volume of unauthorized operations, committed on accounts of legal entities, bln rub.
Volume of unauthorized operations, committed banks and other participants in the payment infrastructure, bln rub.
Amount of unauthorized operations, committed using payment cards (right scale), thousand units
20152014
Fig. 3. Information on the number and volume of unauthorized money transfers in Russia in 2014–
2017
Note: data for some periods are presented in fragmentary form; data for later periods are absent.
B a s e d  o n: Central Bank of Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cbr.ru/fincert/ (accessed: 21.02.2019).
As a result of illegal access to “card” accounts, Russians annually lose about 1 bln rub. 
The number of thefts over the past two years has been increasing almost continuously. For 
example, in 2017 banks reported 317 thousand unauthorized transfers (almost a thousand 
cases daily!). It is important to note that the majority of individual losses (75.6 %) oc-
curred during CNP-transactions, i.e. during clearing transactions in the Internet.
RBS (remote banking) systems of enterprises have a higher degree of cryptographic 
protection than online banking for citizens. They usually use tokens or flash cards, which 
must be connected to the desktop computer to access the bank account. However, despite 
this, annual corporate losses consistently exceed those of citizens, amounting to 1.5–2 bln 
rub. Meanwhile, the number of attempts to obtain illegal access to corporate accounts is 
much lower than to individual current accounts — 700–800 per year (but as a result, hack-
ers instantly seize large sums, usually between 100 thousand to 10 mln rub.).
Management systems of ATMs, “card” processing centers, and correspondent ac-
counts in other credit institutions and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation obvi-
ously have an even higher level of crypto resistance than “conventional” systems. However, 
as practice shows, they do not provide an absolute guarantee of safety — in the last three 
years losses exceeded 7 bln rub.!
The key reason for all the above losses is the impact of malicious codes, i.e. the activity 
of hackers who use special programs to gain unauthorized access to money. More rarely, 
clients themselves (i.e. voluntarily, but as a result of deception) tell the hackers the infor-
mation they need to steal money.
There is a variety of legal software in the world used by banks and other companies 
to run penetration tests on their information systems — Armitage, Cobalt Strike, Empire, 
and others. As the specialists of the Central Bank of Russia note, they “provide an easy-to-
use mechanism for remote management of infected computers… such attacks do not re-
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quire special technical knowledge”39. The software can be purchased or used free of charge 
by anyone during the “demo” period. Much less often hackers use genuinely non-standard 
approaches and original (i.e. their own) programs.
The methods of “social engineering”, by which we mean different methods of “trick-
ing out” card numbers, CVC-codes, etc., are not very diverse. They mostly involve phish-
ing: “Your card is blocked, contact the bank’s security service”, “I’m ready to buy your car 
(Avito ad, Drom, etc.) and make an advance payment to your card, just tell me the code 
that you received on your phone”, etc.
Thus, both banks and end users are mostly targeted by criminal groups consisting of 
either “mediocre” programmers or call-centers of “social psychologists”. Three articles of 
the Russian Criminal Code are primarily used to determine and punish cybercriminals 
(Table 1).
Table 1. Information on penalties imposed for committing cybercrimes in the Russian Federation
Article of the Criminal Code of the 







Par. 3 From the bank account or in relation to electronic money* Up to 6 years 100–500
Par. 4 Organised group / especially large scale (≥ 1 mln rub.) Up to 10 years –
Article 159.3 “Fraud 
involving use of payment 
cards”
Par. 1 Minor damage Up to 3 years < 120
Par. 2 Organised group / considerable damage (≥5 thousand rub.) Up to 5 years ≤300
Par. 3 Large scale (≥250 thousand rub.) Up to 6 years 150–500




Par. 3 From a bank account or in relation to electronic money Up to 5 years 150–500
Par. 4 Especially large scale (≥1 mln rub.) Up to 10 years –
Note: * including by illegal entry into a home, from an oil pipeline, etc.; the amount of fine as an independent type 
of penalty; a dash means “not provided”; par. — paragraph.
B a s e d  o n: Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Materials of ConsultantPlus. URL: http://www.
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/ (accessed: 20.02.2020)).
According to an explanation provided by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federa-
tion, most crimes that involve larceny of money from bank accounts are classified as theft. 
Unlike fraud, theft (under Article 158 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) 
implies stealing money by criminals if they obtained a client’s login/password or card 
number and CVC-code from a client-bank system by means of deception or breach of 
trust and then stole the money. This is because “deception is not directly aimed at seizing 
someone else’s property, but is only used to facilitate access to it”40.
39 Main types of cyber attacks against the financial sector (The Overview of the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation) Central Bank of Russian Federation. URL. http://www.cbr.ru/StaticHtml/File/14435/
gubzi_17.pdf (accessed: 24.02.2019).
40 On the judicial practice in cases of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlement: Resolution of the 
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 30.11.2017, No. 48 (Materials of ConsultantPlus. 
URL. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_283918/ (accessed: 28.02.2019)). 
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Article 159.3 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation applies when theft of prop-
erty was committed by personally presenting stolen or forged payment cards to the cashier 
of a bank or a shop (if money was illegally withdrawn at an ATM, such act is qualified as 
theft). This article, as well as the Article 159.641 on misappropriation effected via computer 
systems, is used quite rarely in Russia (Table 2). 
Table 2. The number of people convicted in Russia under specific articles of  
the Criminal Code in 2012–2018
Article 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018*
Article 159.6 (p. 3–4) – 20 19 16 35 62 36
Article 159.3 – 259 251 154 84 79 94
    For reference
Article 159.6 (part. 1–2) – 39 59 72 89 82 30
Article 159 23 649 19 669 18 033 17 690 17 644 17 757 16 544
Article 158 224 268 213 809 198 990 209 611 199 077 175 390 162 690
Note: * — data for 2018 is obtained by means of doubling the data for the 1st half year.
B a s e d  o n: Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cdep.ru/index.
php?id=79 (accessed: 28.02.2019).
Apparently, the state is much more active in exposing and punishing “common” 
thieves and fraudsters (Articles 158 and 159). The number of “hackers” convicted annu-
ally on a national scale is insignificant, ranging from 20 to 50 (all trials ending in convic-
tions). However, there are even fewer cases involving “bank hackers”, since: a) almost all of 
them are convicted as accomplices; b) under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 158.6 they are 
convicted of “hacking” not only banking, but also other types of information systems. It 
should be noted that the real penalties for such crimes are rather lenient (Table 3).
Table 3. Types of penalties for the offenders convicted under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 159.6 of  
the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in 2017–2018
Type of penalty / Paragraph of 
Article 159.6 / Year
Paragraph 3 Paragraph 4
2017 6 months of 2018 2017  6 months of 2018
Deprivation of freedom 5 – 25 6
Suspended sentence 9 7 17 3
Correctional works – – – –
Fine 6 1 – –
Amnesty – 1 – –
Total 20 9 42 9
Note: а dash means “not provided”.
B a s e d  o n: Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. URL: http://www.cdep.ru/index.
php?id=79 (accessed: 28.02.2019). 
41 The common schemes of such crimes as “creation of fake sites of charity organizations and online 
stores” are regulated by the Article 159 “Fraud”. Even though both Articles 159 and 159.6 establish the same 
maximum penalty (up to 10 years of imprisonment), the criteria for determining the amount of damage 
differ significantly. For example, in the first case especially large scale damage is the damage exceeding 12 
mln rub., while in the second case it amounts to “only” 1 mln rub.
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In practice, in 2018  courts usually imposed a suspended sentence or a fine (5  to 
300 thousand rub.) for fraudulent actions that resulted in damage of up to 1 mln rub. (par. 
3 of Article 159.6). Moreover, in 40 % (!) of cases the criminals were given a suspended 
sentence even under par. 442. The duration of effective imprisonment was usually between 
2 and 5 years.
Based on the above, it is possible to draw the following conclusions. First, Russian 
criminal legislation is somewhat “confusing” with cybercrime being “scattered” under 
various articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and their paragraphs 
regulate not only bank crimes. The latter makes it significantly more difficult to use statis-
tics43 to analyse the impact of punishment on “ordinary” fraudsters and thieves, as well as 
bank hackers. Second, the number of cases involving bank hackers that have been brought 
to court is extremely low. However, it is their “activities” that are most dangerous for the 
advancement of e-banking services. Third, the courts rarely hear cases related to uncom-
pleted crimes (preparation or attempt). This is probably due to victims’ reluctance to ap-
peal to competent authorities when hackers failed to steal money from them. Fourth, the 
courts are taking a very lenient attitude towards computer criminals. As a result, most of 
offenders escape any significant punishment.
In author’s opinion, the results of the government efforts to combat cybercrime in the 
Russian banking sector can hardly be considered satisfactory. This significantly hinders 
the development of modern Internet technologies in banking, including the innovative 
system of remote customer identification.
Key problems in the development of remote client identification in  
the Russian banking system and their solutions
Problem I. The risk of unauthorized access to the Unified Biometric System, which 
may result in: a) disclosure of clients’ personal data to the public (at least in the Internet, 
Tor, darknet); b) use of accumulated biometric data for banking operations by unauthor-
ized persons (criminals). It is important to note that compromised biometric data, unlike 
lost logins, passwords, certificates, PIN codes, etc., cannot be recovered!
Solution. Taking into account the devastating consequences of the above, it is essen-
tial to conduct a lengthy pilot operation of the system (Chinese experience). As the project 
has already been launched in Russia and there is no “turning back” without reputation 
losses, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation should not put too much pressure on 
the banking community (taking into account the Indian experience).
Problem II. Concerns of a large number of citizens regarding breach of their privacy. 
Thus, according to Article 14.1 of the Federal Law No. 149–FZ “On Information…” Ros-
telecom, as an UBS operator, is obliged to provide information stored in a unified biomet-
42 It is impossible not to mention that the number of people who recieved a suspended sentence under 
paragraph 1 of Article 158 applied to those who “stole a sack of potatos” in the first 6 months of 2018 was 
approximately the same as the number of hackers, who inflicted damage in a particularly large amount — 
44 %. The question is whether this is fair.
43 Unfortunately, statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in this matter  are much less informative 
than the materials of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which were 
used in this work.
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ric database upon the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Russian Federal 
Security Service.
Solution. An increased liability for the unauthorised use of information from the UBS, 
together with explanatory and educational activities to reduce social tension. Meanwhile, 
law-abiding citizens obviously have nothing to fear under the primacy of the rule of law.
Problem III. Lack of transparancy regarding the proper testing of the UBS software, 
developer’s and operator’s guarantees, etc. This significantly reduces the confidence of po-
tential users (both banks and citizens) in the project. For example, “requirements to bio-
metric data (face image and voice recording)…” posted on the Rostelecom portal, contain 
a bibliographic list, which includes six works by foreign scholars. This should probably 
increase confidence in the document and the system as a whole. However, all these articles 
are related to the study of voice biometrics [Beigi, 2011; Barinov, 2010; Pearce, 2000].
Solution. Rostelecom, as an EBS operator, should publish on its website: a) technical 
specifications of the systems; b) a positive opinion of an authoritative research institute 
or university including an analysis of relevant studies (rather than 20-year-old materials) 
by leading Russian and foreign scholars; c) a series of popular scientific video that would 
demonstrate the reliability and convenience of the system.
Problem IV. The risk of unauthorized access to the UBS system by unauthorized 
persons who successfully completed the identification procedures. There is no publicly 
available information about the probability of a false matches in the UBS. However, the 
specifications attached to the tender documentation allow 0.1 % probability of a false co-
incidence in the UBS44. So, a computer may make a mistake once in a thousand matches. 
This error value may indeed seem small, but the Amazon American platform, for example, 
with photos of 25 000 criminals uploaded, has “identified” 28 of them among the cur-
rent congressmen45. It would appear that the error in this case was only a minor 0.112 %. 
However, there are implications for this “statistical error”! Besides, repeated experiments 
on the most perfect gadgets confirm that, despite scanning “30 thousand dots and eyes”46, 
twins can easily unlock the bio identification system. Similar results were obtained using 
high-precision human face masks47.
In fact, any biometric recognition system has a problem with setting the degree of 
“accuracy”. If the algorithm is made very “rigid”, then with decreasing the probability of 
second-generation error (acceptance of a false match, which was discussed above), the 
probability of first-generation error will increase (deviation of the correct match). In other 
words, the users will have problems accessing the system (according to the technical spec-
ifications, the probability of false mismatch of the UBS is 3 %).
Solution 1. It is obvious that modern biometric technologies designed for large-scale 
application cannot guarantee a high level of reliability (which must be a priority, since 
we are talking about people’s savings). New customers must be additionally identified by: 
44 D-Russia. URL: http://d-russia.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/TZ-biometriya.pdf (accessed: 
14.02.2019).
45 CNET. URL: https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-facial-recognition-thinks-28-congressmen-
look-like-known-criminals-at-default-settings/ (accessed: 14.02.2019).
46 Iguides. URL: https://www.iguides.ru/main/security/bliznetsy_i_iphone_x_udastsya_li_obmanut_
face_id/ (accessed: 22.02.2019).
47 Macdigger. URL: https://www.macdigger.ru/news/post/face-id-obmanuli-s-pomoshhyu-3d-maski 
(accessed: 22.02.2019).
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a) confirming one-time passwords from a previously registered mobile phone number48; 
b) entering a secret code word. Besides, in order to reduce the risk of forced identification 
(under threat), it is necessary to foresee the possibility of using a combination of words, 
after which the system will be blocked until a personal visit to the bank (the system then 
should a loss of connection or other technical problem).
Solution 2. In fact: a) there is no information about the real capacity of the bioidenti-
fication system; b) the number of bioidentification procedures is by no means unlimited49. 
Therefore, it is necessary (at least at the first stages) to conduct bioidentification under the 
control of the employees of the bank where the client wants to open an account. This fol-
lows the Austrian and Swiss experience and will: a) prevent the violation of Federal Law 
No. 115–FZ; b) detect and correct the existing defects in the new system; c) increase the 
credibility of the project for both the banks and the potential clients.
Solution 3. It is necessary to introduce a mandatory periodic prolongation of citizens’ 
consent (every 3–5 years) to the use of biometric templates, carried out in person at bank 
offices (following the experience of South Korea).
Problem V. At present, the client himself bears the responsibility for unauthorized ac-
cess to the UBS system, as he signs a written statement of consent specifying the relevant 
risks. At the same time, the bioidentification process is not subject to video recording and 
storage. In this case it is very difficult (in fact, almost impossible) for the client to prove his 
innocence during an investigation and in court.
Solution 1. All bioidentification procedures should be video recorded and stored for a 
period of 3–5 years; they should be made available upon request of the competent authori-
ties in the investigation of theft and fraud in the banking sector (Austrian experience).
Solution 2. Rostelecom, as the UBS operator, should create a special fund to compen-
sate clients for the unauthorized use of customer records. The funds should be generated 
by Rostelecom itself and the banks that want to use bio identification for new clients.
Problem VI. The current efforts to combat cybercrime in the banking sector consist 
mainly in “rebuffing” cyber attacks. In the event of actual theft, neither banks nor their 
clients would normally report it to law enforcement agencies. Moreover, banks are not 
authorized to report such crimes if the subject of theft is clients’ money (as formally they 
are not victims). The government, in fact, remains unaware of the majority of crimes com-
mitted, and therefore such crimes are not investigated at all.
Solution 1. Banks should be obliged to report to law enforcement agencies no matter 
how successful the hackers’ attacks have been50. To form a complete picture of computer 
crime, banks should be allowed to accept statements from their clients about thefts to for-
ward the information for further investigation to the law enforcement agencies.
Solution 2. Establishing specialized departments to investigate cybercrimes in the 
banking sphere. It would be sensible to study the UK experience. Since 2017, Financial 
Fraud Action UK, consisting of about 300 financial institutions and banks, has been fund-
48 There are certain problems associated with the illegal reissue of SIM cards of mobile operators in 
this area. However, this is the subject of a separate study.
49 Customers pass it once during initial identification at the bank. Otherwise, the bank will have to 
pay 200 rubles for each client’s entry into “Internet Banking” system which is too expensive. Therefore, 
customers will need to be identified biometrically only once (“at login”) and then will use “traditional” logins 
and passwords from “regular” Internet Bank system.
50 The uncompleted act (attempt or preparation) constitutes an offence.
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ing a special police department to investigate cybercrimes connected with illegal card 
transactions51.
Problem VII. In modern Russia, cybercriminals remain either unpunished or the 
court imposes fairly lenient penalties (fines, suspended sentence).
Solution. Legislative and judicial authorities should pay attention to the serious public 
threats posed by high-tech fraud in electronic banking information. Indeed, the district 
courts are full of young people (usually not older than 30 years) who committed a faux 
pas, rather than hardened criminals. Yet in most cases, the courts deliver minor or sus-
pended sentences for the established offence, and never impose correctional or compul-
sory work (Table 3).
General risks of global digitalization in the process of developing  
the institute of remote biometric identification in Russian banks 
The rapid technological development that took place at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, resulting from digitalization of virtually all sectors of the economy, is, according 
to many scholars, “a key element of the fourth industrial revolution” [Rihter, Pahomova, 
2018]. The level of digitization of the financial and banking sector is constantly growing 
[Belousov, Levchuk, 2018]. Despite obvious advantages, this also increases operational 
and other risks for banks. For example, the author distinguishes three main groups of 
economic risks resulting from the introduction of biometric remote client identification 
initiated by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Group I. Risks related to inaccurate functioning of the remote identification system, 
which lead to direct and indirect material losses of clients and/or banks, as well as repu-
tational losses incurred by credit institutions, operators and vendors of the newly created 
Unified Biometric System.
Group II. Negative impact on the development of the Russian financial and banking 
system due to significant and unorganized changes in its existing structure. The expantion 
of remote interaction with clients may significantly weaken the competitive position of a 
large number of domestic banks, especially medium and small ones, which, due to limited 
financial resources, will not be able to fully integrate their business into the new digital 
model of interaction with customers. Despite the fact that this risk is generally market re-
lated, it may lead to certain destabilization of the domestic banking system in the medium 
term due to disorderly exit of a number of uncompetitive banks from the market (as it 
happened in the Russian banking system earlier).
Group III. Social and economic risks associated with a significant reduction in the 
number of bank employees engaged in direct interaction with clients. It should be noted 
that these risks are among the general risks of the fourth industrial revolution which is ex-
pected to replace low- and medium-skilled specialists with artificial intelligence [Maslov, 
Luk’yanov, 2017].
Regulation of the above risks (in order to minimize negative economic and socio-
economic consequences) is only possible if the institute of remote client identification in 
the domestic banking system is operational. Therefore, they should be taken into account 
51 Financial Fraud Action UK. URL: https://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/police/ (accessed: 
24.02.2019).
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when adopting regulatory measures in the relevant area in the future — both in the me-
dium- and long-term perspective.
Conclusion
The analysis of scholarly literature, as well as the global experience of developed and 
developing countries, demonstrates convincingly the advantages of the national institu-
tions of remote client identification by banks. However, their technological characteristics 
differ significantly. Foreign countries employ different approaches combining biometric 
and non-biometric methods (online video identification, use of traditional logins/pass-
words, etc.). In Russia, the Central Bank of Russia initiated the creation of the national 
institute of remote biometric client identification using photo and audio templates of 
citizens collected on a centralized basis. Despite the fact that similar opportunities were 
provided to commercial banks on July 1, 2018, de facto they do not take an active part in 
the innovation project. There are two groups of reasons explaining this fact: lack of eco-
nomic motivation and unwillingness of clients (individuals) to submit biometric data on 
a voluntary basis. It should be emphasized that these reasons (which have been described 
in detail above) are objective in nature. The author has also identified seven main groups 
of key problems that hinder the systemic development of the institute of remote identifi-
cation of clients in the Russian banking system, provided practical recommendations to 
address them in the short and medium term, and outlined a number of common risks that 
global digitalization poses for the establishment of an innovation institute in Russia for the 
purpose of overcoming economic and social problems. This made it possible to confirm 
the correctness of the originally formulated scientific hypothesis, as well as to achieve the 
goal of scientific research and fulfil all the tasks set within it.
Implementation of the project on remote client identification in the Russian banking 
system is, undoubtedly, a step in the right direction. A new generation of clients is already 
prepared for new and unconventional communication technologies. However, to reach real 
positive potential of the bioidentification system, it is necessary to pay attention to objec-
tive problems in this area. If they are ignored (as is currently the case), direct losses, repu-
tational losses, and lack of credibility among the population and banks can literally “bury” 
this undoubtedly ambitious and innovative social and economic institution in Russia.
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Статья посвящена анализу экономических аспектов становления в России института 
удаленной идентификации кредитными организациями своих клиентов, целесообраз-
ность развития которого обусловлена перманентной диджитализацией модели взаи-
модействия субъектов банковских отношений. В  работе представлены результаты 
анализа экономических аспектов функционирования удаленной идентификации бан-
ками своих клиентов в развитых и развивающихся зарубежных странах (Австрии, Ве-
ликобритании, Индии, Китае, США, Швеции, Швейцарии и Южной Корее), раскрыты 
теоретические и практические особенности функционирования системы банковской 
биометрической идентификации в России на современном этапе. На основании ком-
плексного анализа сформулированы экономические причины отсутствия мотивации 
у большинства отечественных банков в развитии нового института. Впервые в россий-
ской экономической литературе в систематизированном виде раскрыты ключевые про-
блемы, являющиеся сдерживающими факторами развития института удаленной иден-
тификации клиентов в России: а) риск несанкционированного доступа к центрально-
му хранилищу данных; б)  опасения относительно нарушения приватности частной 
жизни; в)  отсутствие в  свободном доступе материалов об апробации программного 
обеспечения, гарантиях компаний-разработчика, оператора и т. д.; г) риск получения 
несанкционированного доступа к  Единой биометрической системе путем успешно-
го прохождения идентификационных процедур посторонними; д)  риск финансовых 
убытков от несанкционированного доступа к данной системе, переложенный на кли-
ентов; е) неудовлетворительные результаты борьбы с банковской киберпреступностью 
в России. Автором представлен ряд научно обоснованных предложений по преодоле-
нию указанных проблем и минимизации экономических рисков использования систе-
мы удаленной идентификации клиентов в России с учетом позитивного и негативного 
опыта, накопленного за рубежом.
Ключевые слова: биометрия, видео-идентификация, Единая биометрическая система, 
идентификация клиента, киберпреступление, онлайн-идентификация, финтех, эконо-
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